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SPEAK NO EVIL: MGM V. GROKSTER’S POTENTIAL FREE 
SPEECH IMPLICATIONS IN THE WAKE OF THE INDUCEMENT 
STANDARD AND SECONDARY LIABILITY FOR EXPRESSION 
Scott J. Sholder∗
INTRODUCTION 
After the downfall of the infamous file-sharing program Napster 
and its progeny, such as Aimster, a new breed of peer-to-peer (“P2P”) 
digital file-sharing programs took over the illicit downloading mar-
ketplace.1  This next generation of software sought to replace its 
fallen comrades and hoped to reel in an already-existing user base 
which was salivating for a new way to amass free media files,2 while 
the recording and movie industries continued their lawsuit campaign 
as they had against the predecessor software.3  Recently, the Supreme 
Court of the United States, in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. 
Grokster, Ltd. (“MGM”),4 decided that the creators of software that in-
vited illegal downloading could be held secondarily liable for their 
users’ infringements; such liability would attach if the creators en-
couraged the infringement in violation of a version of the “induce-
 ∗ J.D. Candidate, May 2007, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2004, 
American University.  I would like to send a sincere thanks to my advisor Professor 
Frank Pasquale for all of his invaluable advice, guidance, and support in creating this 
Comment. 
 1 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2770 
(2005).  The Court explains the nuances of the Grokster and Streamcast technology.  
Id.  Essentially, the programs differ from their older counterparts in that the manu-
facturers’ software allows computer users to share and transfer files “directly with 
each other, not through central servers.”  Id.  This eliminates expensive storage 
space, allows for faster transfers and communications, and decreases the risk of secu-
rity breaches or harmful glitches.  Id. 
 2 Id. at 2772–73. 
 3 Benny Evangelista, Music File-Sharing Case Before High Court; Ruling Could Have 
Major Effect on Future of Entertainment Industry, Consumer Rights, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 28, 
2005, at A1 (To date, the Recording Industry Association of America (“RIAA”) has 
sued 9900 people individually for downloading music; the RIAA began filing individ-
ual suits in September, 2003.). 
 4 MGM, 125 S. Ct. at 2770. 
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ment” rule often utilized in patent infringement cases.5  This decision 
was seen as a huge victory for the recording industry,6 although some 
commentators question whether this opinion was, indeed, harmful to 
makers of software, or whether the programmers will simply bounce 
back with another tide of new technology.7
It is a well-established notion that technology and copyright pro-
tection butt heads like rams vying for common territory.8  As a result, 
the MGM Court hinders innovation and, simultaneously, threatens to 
constrain First Amendment free speech rights9 of software producers, 
marketers, and advertisers, by favoring copyright over technological 
innovation.10
 5 Id. 
 6 Matthew Ingram, Entertainment Industry Victory May Be Hollow, N.Z. HERALD, July 
5, 2005 (noting that “the entertainment industry got what it clearly felt was a victory 
in its fight against illegal downloading of music and movies”); see also Recording In-
dustry Association of America, RIAA Statement on MGM v. Grokster Supreme Court Rul-
ing, June 27, 2005, http://www.riaa.com/news/newsletter/062705.asp (“This deci-
sion lays the groundwork for the dawn of a new day—an opportunity that will bring 
the entertainment and technology communities even closer together, with music 
fans reaping the rewards.”). 
 7 Stephen Kiehl, Abigail Tucker & Sam Sessa, Is Ruling End of File-Sharing? Indus-
try Hopes So, But Users Say Free Music Will Never Die, BALT. SUN, June 29, 2005, at A1 
(“As quickly as authorities find ways to curtail the free downloading of music, con-
sumers find ways around them.”).  Websites and programs exist that authorities do 
not know about yet and new technology is developing constantly.  Id.; see also Jon 
Pareles, The Court Ruled, So Enter The Geeks, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2005, at E1.  Software 
writers simply established  
independent, ad-free networks or, like Bittorrent, facilitated multi-
ple individual connections.  The court’s decision may torpedo the 
parasitical, ad-pumping services like Grokster, Kazaa and Morpheus, 
but no one’s going to miss them much.  There are plenty of geek al-
ternatives that were devised not as business startups, but for the pro-
grammers’ satisfaction and the users’ sense of connection. 
Id.  
 8 Professor Lawrence Lessig of Stanford University Law School describes this 
conflict: 
It is the duty of policy makers . . . to assure that the changes they cre-
ate, in response to the request of those hurt by changing technology, 
are changes that preserve the incentives and opportunities for innova-
tion and change.  In the context of laws regulating speech—which in-
clude, obviously, copyright law—that duty is even stronger.  When the 
industry complaining about changing technologies is asking Congress 
to respond in a way that burdens speech and creativity, policy makers 
should be especially wary of the request.  It is always a bad deal for the 
government to get into the business of regulating speech markets. 
LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 128 (2004), available at http://www.free-
culture.cc/freeculture.pdf. 
 9 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom 
of speech . . . .”). 
 10 See infra Part III. 
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Copyright law also often comes into conflict with the First 
Amendment.11  The MGM Court has ruled in favor of copyright and 
has adopted the inducement rule as its flimsy plywood barrier to pro-
tect free speech from the onslaught of the copyright doctrine.  Now, 
due to new concerns for free speech created by MGM, courts must 
take First Amendment values into careful consideration before 
blindly applying the MGM Court’s inducement rule.  This Comment 
suggests that courts consider a more speech-protective interpretation 
of the inducement rule in light of the concrete wall of protection af-
forded to speech via the incitement standard.12  This solution arises 
from an analysis comparing the MGM decision and its potential free 
speech limitations to media incitement cases that took a more estab-
lished route through a similar free speech labyrinth.13
This Comment, however, is about more than just the MGM deci-
sion.  It scrutinizes secondary liability for expression using MGM as a 
vehicle for analysis.  This Comment does not suggest that the solution 
to the impending free speech problem is to wholly replace the MGM 
Court’s inducement standard or to rewrite or abandon the Court’s 
opinion.  It does suggest, however, that courts faced with similar dis-
putes in the future should use a stricter, more speech-sensitive inter-
pretation of the inducement standard that, for guidance, hearkens 
more to the expression-protective incitement test than the patent in-
ducement rule.14  Courts should shift toward a more incitement-like 
interpretation of inducement because of the First Amendment rights 
currently endangered by the MGM Court’s importation of a secon-
dary liability standard that properly applies to cases about things (i.e., 
patented inventions) but not to cases about expression (i.e., copy-
righted materials, advertisements, etc.).  Using incitement as a base 
will establish a firmer groundwork for secondary liability in the ex-
pression context. 
Part I of this Comment provides a general overview of the situa-
tion at hand, with Part I.A explaining the MGM case, its holding, and 
 11 Michael D. Birnhack, Copyright Law and Free Speech After Eldred v. Ashcroft, 76 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1275, 1280–81 (2003) (criticizing judicial rejection of the conflict be-
tween the First Amendment and copyright, and reiterating the presence of such a 
conflict and its ramifications). 
 12 The incitement test states that “the constitutional guarantees of free speech 
and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of 
force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or pro-
ducing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”  
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
 13 See infra Part II.B. 
 14 See infra Part II.B. 
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its version of the inducement rule.  Part I.B lays out the bizarre land-
scape of secondary liability as well as the highly ambiguous conduct 
of the MGM manufacturers and downloaders.  This section suggests 
that the inducement rule is unworkable and should be clarified and 
refined because it provides so little guidance.  Part I.B.1 explains the 
inducement rule’s lack of clarity in the context of disclaimers and 
analyzes problems that inducement would create when applied to 
such speech.  Part I.B.2 further analyzes the inducement test’s ambi-
guity based on the diversity of concurrences found in the MGM deci-
sion, itself.  Part II asks how courts can elucidate the murky induce-
ment standard, with Part II.A dismissing the patent context as a 
means of clarification.  Part II.B, however, determines that media in-
citement cases clarify the standard because these cases involve secon-
dary liability based on expression, just like MGM.  This section will 
summarize the results of several landmark cases involving incitement 
suits against the media for violent action on the part of its consumers, 
thus establishing a basis of comparison to MGM in the context of sec-
ondary liability for expression.  This section ultimately concludes that 
the manufacturers’ speech in MGM would not pass incitement-level 
scrutiny and would thus be deemed protected speech.  Part III notes 
that copyright law must acknowledge the First Amendment, and thus 
provides a discussion regarding the differences between inducement 
and incitement and their suitability to different types of intellectual 
property.  It concludes that since the speech at issue in MGM is more 
closely related to the copyrightable expression seen in the “violent 
media” cases, a test akin to incitement is more appropriate because, 
unlike the patent inducement test, it inherently accounts for speech-
specific contingencies. 
This Comment ultimately finds that file-sharing secondary liabil-
ity cases should be interpreted in light of the incitement standard, as 
incitement is merely a version of inducement that is more speech-
protective and more appropriately aimed at expression.  The goal is 
to preserve First Amendment free speech rights in the ever-
burgeoning P2P software industry.  The solution is not to rewrite the 
MGM decision, but to clarify the standard with guidance from the in-
citement test, the conflict between copyright and free speech, and 
the various policy issues at stake.  The aim of this Comment is neither 
to express an opinion on the propriety of illegal downloading nor to 
take either the downloaders’ or industries’ sides on that main issue.  
The focus is on free speech concerns and the analytical problems in-
volved in the Court’s adoption of a particular rule. 
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I. AN OVERVIEW: SETTING THE TONE 
A. The MGM Decision and the Inducement Standard: A Case and Its 
Rule 
In MGM, the Supreme Court of the United States decided that 
P2P software manufacturers (“manufacturers”) could be held secon-
darily liable for their users’ infringement if they actively induced or 
“encouraged” the infringement through “clear expression or other 
affirmative steps taken to foster infringement.”15  The manufacturers 
of the Grokster and Streamcast software distributed free programs 
which allowed users to share digital media files through P2P networks 
(which communicate computer-to-computer, unlike older programs, 
such as Napster, which linked up to a central server).16  Although 
some of the material traded and downloaded on the manufacturers’ 
software were in the public domain (such as plays by Shakespeare) or 
were available through consent of the copyright owners, the Court 
noted that the vast majority of the downloads were of copyrighted 
materials posted without the consent of the owners, thus constituting 
copyright infringement by the users.17  The manufacturers did not 
contest their awareness that their users utilized the programs “pri-
marily to download copyrighted files”; they knew about these in-
 15 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2770 
(2005) (“We hold that one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its 
use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps 
taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third 
parties.”).  The case against Grokster appears to have been settled.  Kevin Allison, The 
Battle for Grokster Leaves a War to Be Won DIGITAL MUSIC: With the File-Sharing Company 
Out of Action, Some in the Record Business Are Upbeat.  But, Writes Kevin Allison, There is 
Trouble Ahead, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 20, 2005, at 12 (“In November, the music 
industry won a big scalp after Grokster, the peer-to-peer file-sharing service, agreed 
to shut down as part of a legal settlement.”). 
 16 MGM, 125 S. Ct. at 2770. 
 17 Id. at 2772.  This proposition is disputed in the manufacturers’ amicus brief.  
Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Respondents at 4, Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc., v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005) (No. 04-480), 
available at http://www.copyright.gov/docs/mgm/lunney-law-profs.pdf [hereinafter 
“Lunney Amicus Brief”] (“Applying the equitable rule of reason approach to fair use 
that this Court established for private copying in Sony Corp., the undersigned Amici 
would respectfully suggest that much of the unauthorized sharing of copyrighted 
works through P2P networks constitute a fair and hence noninfringing use.”).  Lun-
ney notes that unauthorized P2P file sharing replaced legitimate market purchases in 
“less than ten percent of the P2P file sharing at issue.  As for the remaining ninety 
percent, the petitioners have altogether failed to prove that this type of P2P file shar-
ing substitutes for authorized access or is otherwise unfair.”  Id. at 24. 
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fringements from user e-mails asking for guidance regarding the play-
ing of copyrighted material.18
From their inception, the Court noted, Grokster and Streamcast 
were intended to be used to download copyrighted works, and their 
creators made this intent known and encouraged infringement.19  
The manufacturers marketed their programs directly to former Nap-
ster users, promoting their products as Napster alternatives in order 
to recapture a horde of technophiles wandering aimlessly in a desert 
devoid of free downloads.20  Grokster even sent a newsletter to users 
which touted “its ability to provide particular, popular copyrighted 
materials.”21  The Court noted that both manufacturers’ business 
models indicated their objective to encourage copyright infringe-
ment: since the software was free, income would come from selling 
advertising space which was worth much more as the user base in-
creased, suggesting that “volume is a function of free access to copy-
righted work.”22  Also, neither service blocked infringers nor “fil-
ter[ed] copyrighted material,” and both turned away companies that 
solicited monitoring services to try to catch infringers.23
The United States District Court for the Central District of Cali-
fornia granted the manufacturers’ summary judgment motions and 
held that Grokster and Streamcast were not secondarily liable be-
 18 MGM, 125 S. Ct. at 2772. 
 19 Id.  
Grokster and StreamCast are not, however, merely passive recipients 
of information about infringing use.  The record is replete with evi-
dence that from the moment Grokster and StreamCast began to dis-
tribute their free software, each one clearly voiced the objective that 
recipients use it to download copyrighted works, and each took ac-
tive steps to encourage infringement. 
Id.  
 20 Id. at 2772–73.  The Court looked to internal company documents and press 
kits sent to potential advertisers that indicated Streamcast was “similar to what Nap-
ster was” and would be “positioned to capture the flood of their 32 million users that 
will be actively looking for an alternative.”  Id. at 2773.  Streamcast also created pro-
motional marketing materials to market itself as a Napster alternative (which may or 
may not have been publicly released—a factor the Court disregarded due to the ma-
terials’ reflection of Streamcast’s intent).  Id.  The materials contained statements 
such as “Napster Inc. has announced that it will soon begin charging you a fee.  
That’s if the courts don’t order it to shut down first.  What will you do to get around 
it?” and “when the lights went off at Napster . . . where did the users go?”  MGM, 125 
S. Ct. at 2773.  Grokster’s name was an apparent Napster spin-off, and its makers 
used digital codes to direct search engine inquiries on “free filesharing” to Grokster’s 
website.  Id.  
 21 Id. at 2774. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
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cause use of their software “did not provide the distributors with ac-
tual knowledge of specific acts of infringement.”24  The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, citing Sony Corp. of 
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.25 in holding that “distribution of a 
commercial product capable of substantial noninfringing uses could 
not give rise to contributory liability for infringement unless the dis-
tributor had actual knowledge of specific instances of infringement 
and failed to act on that knowledge.”26  The Ninth Circuit essentially 
held that there was no liability because the manufacturers’ software 
used no central server and the makers did not engage in any other 
affirmative activities aside from providing the software.27
The Supreme Court of the United States, however, disagreed 
with the Ninth Circuit and held that the appellate court had misap-
plied the Sony rule.28  The Ninth Circuit’s actual knowledge standard 
was excessively broad, thus extending Sony too far because Sony did 
not “displace other theories of secondary liability.”29  Therefore, the 
Court declined to further analyze Sony and the copyright owners’ 
knowledge theory because “nothing in Sony requires courts to ignore 
evidence of intent if there is such evidence, and the case was never 
meant to foreclose rules of fault-based liability derived from the 
common law.”30  The Court noted that “where evidence goes beyond 
 24 Id. 
 25 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984) (holding that VCRs were “capable of substantial non-
infringing uses” and therefore the manufacturer could not be held secondarily liable 
based solely on its distribution).  The MGM Court notes that this standard is bor-
rowed from patent law’s “staple article of commerce” doctrine which states that “dis-
tribution of a component of a patented device will not violate the patent if it is suit-
able for use in other ways.”  MGM, 125 S. Ct. at 2777 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) 
(2000) and Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 485 
(1964)).  The author is aware that the Sony Court integrated a patent standard into 
copyright law and that this decision has stood the test of time.  That said, this Com-
ment later distinguishes patent and copyright law for the purpose of criticizing the 
patent inducement rule as applied in a copyright context.  See infra Part III.  This 
Comment distinguishes the Sony scenario and does not question the adoption of a 
patent doctrine in that case.  Such an integration as seen in Sony did not raise any 
noteworthy First Amendment issues because commercial speech (i.e. advertisements 
and marketing plans) was not affected by the Court’s holding.  Unlike in MGM, the 
copyright holders in Sony claimed liability solely due to the distribution of a product, 
not due to the underlying speech that facilitated the distribution.  See Sony, 464 U.S. at 
419.  Thus, the two scenarios are fundamentally different, and the author does not 
suggest that the Sony rule is misguided merely because it also hearkens to patent law. 
 26 MGM, 125 S. Ct. at 2775. 
 27 Id. at 2774–75. 
 28 Id. at 2778. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. at 2779. 
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a product’s characteristics or the knowledge that it may be put to in-
fringing uses, and shows statements or actions directed to promoting 
infringement, Sony’s staple-article rule will not preclude liability.”31
Rather than relying solely on Sony, the Court complemented the 
staple-article rule by adopting its own interpretation of the induce-
ment standard32 from patent law: “one who distributes a device with 
the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by 
clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringe-
ment, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third par-
ties.”33  In adopting this standard, the Court noted that the induce-
ment rule “premises liability on purposeful, culpable expression and 
conduct,” rather than mere knowledge of the product’s potential to 
infringe, actual infringing uses, or steps taken in the normal course 
of business or product distribution, such as technical support.34  
Thus, the Court opined that the inducement test “does nothing to 
compromise legitimate commerce or discourage innovation having a 
lawful promise.”35
The Court found the required unlawful objective fairly easily, 
looking to the following elements to reach its conclusion: 
• The manufacturers’ advertisements to former Napster users; 
• Offerings of Napster-like software with similar names and simi-
lar functions; 
• Grokster’s newsletter touting its ability to download copy-
righted music; 
• Grokster’s diversion of P2P file-sharing search engine queries 
to its own website; 
• Streamcast’s (as yet unpublished) advertising campaigns aimed 
at former Napster users; 
• Both companies’ technical assistance to users in finding copy-
righted material; and 
• Both companies’ refusal to filter shared copyrighted material.36 
The “unlawful objective [was] unmistakable” in light of concrete evi-
dence of mass copyright infringement by users, and the Court ulti-
 31 Id. 
 32 See infra Part II.A and note 109 for a full explanation of the rule and its nu-
ances. 
 33 MGM, 125 S. Ct. at 2780. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. at 2780–81. 
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mately found that the Ninth Circuit’s grant of summary judgment was 
erroneous.37
The central focus of the MGM decision and of this Comment is, 
of course, the inducement standard and its possible ramifications.  
Logically, the rule itself requires a bit more clarification than what 
was stated above.  The inducement rule, in the context of patent law, 
has been codified, and states that “whoever actively induces in-
fringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.”38  The induce-
ment standard, as articulated by the Court in MGM, is as follows: 
Evidence of “active steps . . . taken to encourage direct infringe-
ment,” such as advertising an infringing use or instructing how to 
engage in an infringing use, show an affirmative intent that the 
product be used to infringe, and a showing that infringement was 
encouraged overcomes the law’s reluctance to find liability when 
a defendant merely sells a commercial product suitable for some 
lawful use.39
Inducement, in terms of patent infringement, will be explained more 
below.40
B. The Secondary Liability Landscape and Inducement’s Road to 
Nowhere 
This Comment is not simply about the MGM case.  It encom-
passes the more general idea that secondary and contributory liabil-
ity, as concepts, are a bit strange, especially because they seem to ap-
ply in differing degrees to issues as life-threatening as gun control or 
as comparatively miniscule as copyright protection.41  It seems odd 
that copyright holders so badly want to hold technological innova-
tors—whose creations are capable of copyright infringement—
secondarily liable for users’ infringements when, analogously, those 
injured by firearms are rarely ever able to hold gun manufacturers li-
able for personal injuries suffered as the result of a gunshot.42  Ap-
parently the unbearable loss of human life and the life-shattering re-
 37 Id. at 2782. 
 38 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2000). 
 39 MGM, 125 S. Ct. at 2779 (internal citations omitted). 
 40 See infra Part II.A. 
 41 See Alfred C. Yen, A Personal Injury Law Perspective on Copyright in an Inter-
net Age, 52 Hastings L.J. 929, 931 (2001) (“[I]f [measures desired by copyright hold-
ers] seem more drastic than those we are willing to accept when guarding against se-
rious physical injury or death [in personal injury or gun control law], then perhaps 
recent efforts to expand copyright protection have gone too far.”). 
 42 Id. at 934 (noting that “plaintiffs injured by misuse of guns or alcohol have 
practically no chance of recovering from gun or alcohol manufacturers”). 
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sults of serious physical injury are not reasons enough to push courts 
and legislatures to ban possession of guns.  So how can copyright 
holders justify secondary liability for copyright infringement when 
the infringement “inflicts intangible economic injuries, and not the 
physical personal injuries that justify the use of enterprise liability in 
tort law”?43  Indeed, “the use of enterprise liability to protect copy-
rights seems even stranger” when we compare real, physical injuries 
with mere economic harm.44
In tort law, “doctrines of defect, proximate cause, and assump-
tion of risk . . . limit the reach of enterprise liability,” making it nearly 
impossible for injured plaintiffs to recover from gun manufacturers.45  
It seems logical, then, that fair use,46 the free speech safety valve ana-
logue in copyright law, would lead to the same conclusion—the in-
ability to impute secondary liability for copyright infringement to 
manufacturers like Grokster or Streamcast.  The Supreme Court of 
the United States has even emphasized that fair use acts as a safety 
valve when copyright and the First Amendment clash.47  Fair use in 
the MGM context would likely involve the downloading of public 
domain works, the downloading of copyrighted works with the con-
sent of the owners,48 non-commercial uses of the works, or commer-
cial uses lacking a significant effect on the market for a particular 
copyrighted work.49
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. at 933. 
 46 Analysis of four non-exclusive factors determines whether a use is fair: “(1) the 
purpose and character of the use; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the 
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; (4) 
the effect on the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.”  Harper & 
Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560–61 (1985). 
 47 Recent case law supports this proposition: 
[T]he “fair use” defense allows the public to use not only facts and 
ideas contained in a copyrighted work, but also expression itself in cer-
tain circumstances.  Codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107, the defense provides: 
“The fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduc-
tion in copies . . . , for purposes such as criticism, comment, news re-
porting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), schol-
arship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.”  The fair use 
defense affords considerable “latitude for scholarship and comment,”  
. . . and even for parody . . . . 
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219–20 (2003) (internal citations omitted). 
 48 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2772 
(2005). 
 49 See supra notes 46–47. 
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As seen in MGM, however, the scope of fair use and the nature 
of the downloaded works were highly contested.50  The conduct at is-
sue was extremely ambiguous; there was no way for experts, much less 
the Court, to determine whether each individual download was fair 
or infringing;51 this confusion muddied the waters even further as to 
the appropriateness of secondary liability for expression on the part 
of the manufacturers.  Despite a lack of definitive evidence showing 
that the users’ downloads were not fair,52 and despite the presence of 
evidence suggesting that a majority of the uses were fair,53 the Court 
still found that the software manufacturers could be secondarily li-
able via inducement—despite the fair use safety valve—based on the 
quantity of files downloaded and the intent and actions of the manu-
facturers.54
As strange as the concept of secondary liability may be in the ex-
pression context, especially in MGM, it is not altogether invalid.  
There are situations where the rule could be legitimately applied in 
order to protect the public from physical harm.  As seen in Rice v. 
Paladin Enterprises, Inc.,55 expression can sometimes, though very rarely, 
lose its First Amendment protection when it incites violence on the 
part of its recipient.56  Eugene Volokh, a law professor at UCLA Law 
School, addresses other limited situations where secondary liability 
for expression may be proper, such as when a publication teaches 
readers how to make nuclear bombs.57  Volokh qualifies these cir-
cumstances with the idea that such liability should only be imputed 
 50 MGM, 125 S. Ct. at 2772 (“MGM commissioned a statistician to conduct a sys-
tematic search, and his study showed that nearly 90% of the [available] files . . . were 
copyrighted works.  [Manufacturers] dispute this figure . . . arguing that free copying 
even of copyrighted works may be authorized . . . [and] potential noninfringing uses 
of their software are significant in kind . . . .”). 
 51 Id. (“[T]he parties’ anecdotal and statistical evidence entered thus far to show 
the content available on the FastTrack and Gnutella networks does not say much 
about which files are actually downloaded by users, and no one can say how often the 
software is used to obtain copies of unprotected material.”). 
 52 Id. at 2788–89 (Breyer, J., concurring).  Justice Breyer observes that the ten 
percent of potentially noninfringing files offered on Grokster and Streamcast was 
approximately the same percentage found to be fair in the Sony case.  Id.  He also 
noted that MGM “has offered no evidence sufficient to survive summary judgment 
that could plausibly demonstrate a significant quantitative difference” to counter the 
fair use argument.  Id. at 2789 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 53 Lunney Amicus Brief, supra note 17, at 22–26. 
 54 MGM, 125 S. Ct. at 2772. 
 55 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997) (instruction manual on contract killing lost its 
First Amendment protection because it incited and aided and abetted a grisly triple 
homicide). 
 56 Id. at 250; see infra Part II.B and notes 185–87. 
 57 Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1095, 1097 (2005). 
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based on a suggested rule that would narrow the circumstances in 
which expression would lose its First Amendment protection.58
The ultimate question, then, is: why extend secondary liability to 
manufacturers like Grokster and Streamcast?  Copyright infringe-
ment is not a matter of life or death, and as seen above (and as will be 
seen below), expression rarely loses its protection even when situa-
tions do involve life or death.  This question begs courts to clarify the 
inducement rule adopted by the MGM Court in order to align secon-
dary liability jurisprudence with the current trend in analogous areas 
of the law, and to afford more First Amendment protection to speak-
ers in situations similar to MGM.  In order to decide how to refine 
and clarify the rule, however, we must first analyze why it is unwork-
able, and therefore leads future courts on a winding dirt road to no-
where. 
1. The Disclaimer Dilemma: A Paradox 
One problem courts will encounter in strictly applying the MGM 
inducement standard is how to treat disclaimers.  Can a speaker cir-
cumvent the inducement rule simply by placing a disclaimer on a 
product, advertisement, or marketing scheme?  It seems that there 
are two potential outcomes in the disclaimer situation, both of which 
expose the inducement standard as an imprecise choice as the gov-
erning rule in these situations. 
Outcome One: What if the makers of Grokster and Streamcast 
had inserted a warning stating “Do not use this product to infringe 
copyrighted material” or “Warning, this product has the potential to 
infringe copyrighted material.  Grokster/Streamcast does not sanc-
tion this type of use and encourages its customers to use the software 
only in a legal capacity”?  This type of warning may look good on its 
face.  Potentially, these speakers could avoid liability under the in-
ducement rule because they did the opposite of what the rule prohib-
its—actively encouraging infringement.  Such disclaimers would be 
used to discourage illegal use.  This first outcome allows speakers to 
avoid the inducement rule rather easily just by adding a few words to 
 
 58 Volokh notes that 
crime-facilitating speech ought to be constitutionally protected unless 
(1) it’s said to a person or a small group of people when the speaker 
knows these few listeners are likely to use the information for criminal 
purposes, (2) it’s within one of the few classes of speech that has almost 
no noncriminal value, or (3) it can cause extraordinarily serious harm 
(on the order of a nuclear attack or a plague) even when it’s also valu-
able for lawful purposes. 
Id. at 1106. 
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their advertisements or on the packaging their products.  Under 
these circumstances, the inducement standard will be seen as ex-
tremely weak and easy to avoid altogether.  There would not be much 
left of the MGM decision in the universe of this outcome. 
Volokh addresses this issue in his article about speech that facili-
tates criminal activities.59  The author notes first that restrictions on 
advertisements that promote “improper uses of a work burden lawful 
uses only slightly, because the same material could be distributed if it 
weren’t billed as promoting illegal uses,” and such restrictions could 
even decrease illegal use.60  Volokh notes, however, that if courts fo-
cus on the advertising or marketing of speech that has potential ille-
gal uses, the speakers could “just slightly change their speech so that 
it doesn’t look like an overt appeal to illegal users” and the message 
“could still be communicated if it’s not presented in a way that 
stresses the illegal uses.”61
Outcome Two: Could such a disclaimer as mentioned above 
constitute inducement in and of itself?  It is possible that the mere 
mention of the potential for illegal use, especially a tempting use that 
leads to free music and movies, could be considered an inducement 
to infringe copyright.  This second outcome would lead to an in-
ducement standard stretched far beyond its reasonable boundaries.  
The expansiveness of the rule in this outcome would mean that no 
precautions the speaker took could prevent inducement liability be-
cause the speaker’s acts of prevention would themselves be induce-
ments even if the speaker honestly is trying to prevent and discourage 
illegal use of its product.  In this universe, the inducement rule would 
not only infringe upon free speech rights in advertisements, but it 
would reach so far as to infringe upon free speech rights in disclaimers 
in advertisements.  This outcome allows too much leeway in an al-
ready broad standard, and allows the inducement rule to spill over its 
levees. 
Donald S. Chisum, in his treatise on patent law, has even ad-
dressed this dilemma.62  His treatise notes that “[e]ven an express 
warning to customers against infringing use will not preclude liability 
if under the circumstances the warning invites such use.”63  This 
 
 59 Id. at 1200. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. at 1201.  Volokh’s examples of this phenomenon include “term-paper Web 
sites” which “already present themselves as offering mere ‘example essays,’ and say 
things like ‘the papers contained within our web site are for research purposes 
only!’”  Id. 
 62 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 17.04(4)(f) (2005). 
 63 Id. 
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quandary could potentially plague inducement standard jurispru-
dence, especially as applied to such amorphous concepts as creative 
and expressive speech, whether artistic, political, or commercial. 
To put this paradox in a context close to that of MGM, it is use-
ful to look at the “Hear Your Music Anywhere” Project (“Hymn”).64  
Hymn is a software provider that allows Apple iTunes users to “free” 
their purchased music downloads “from their DRM restrictions with 
no loss of sound quality.”65  By converting these music files away from 
their current file format, users would be able to play the songs out-
side of the iTunes software, which is where the DRM file format re-
stricts them.66  The program is used to decrypt songs so they can be 
played through other software, on other operating systems, and on 
more computers.67  It is also used to “make archival backups of your 
music” to use on a portable MP3 player other than an iPod.68
The website states that another purpose of the software is to 
“demonstrate your belief in the principles of fair-use under copyright 
law.”69  Software such as Hymn’s could be viewed as similar to that of 
Grokster and Streamcast in that it may have potential noninfringing 
uses such as creating archival backups,70 but could still be used for 
secondary copyright infringement that is arguably encouraged by the 
maker.71  Were Hymn to place a disclaimer on its website or in the 
software license agreement that read “This software is for fair use 
only,” would they be out of harm’s way?  Based on the present inter-
pretation of the inducement standard, copyright owners likely would 
 64 Hear Your Music Anywhere, http://www.hymn-project.org (last visited Apr. 5, 
2007). 
 65 Id. (“DRM” refers to the file format in which downloaded iTunes songs are de-
livered). 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 June M. Besek, Anti-Circumvention Laws and Copyright: A Report from the Kerno-
chan Center for Law, Media and the Arts, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 385, 471–72 (2004) 
(“Some consumptive use copying is privileged, such as in-home copying of free 
broadcast television for later viewing, copying [certain] sound recordings . . . and 
making backup copies of computer programs.”).  Besek also notes that the “Audio 
Home Recording Act (“AHRA”) contains a privilege to make analog and certain digi-
tal copies of musical recordings” in some circumstances.  Id. at 472. 
 71 Copyright owners would claim violations of their exclusive rights under the 
copyright statute, 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).  They would most likely sue for contribu-
tory infringement of their right of reproduction under § 106(1) or digital perform-
ance rights under § 106(6).  They could also argue that “due to its narrow defini-
tions, works copied by means of computers do not qualify for the AHRA privilege.”  
Besek, supra note 70, at 472. 
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argue for an expansive reading of the inducement rule, making this 
disclaimer an inducement in and of itself.  Alternatively, if a court de-
cided that this disclaimer was enough to satisfy MGM, there would 
not be much left of the rule, as this disclaimer “exemption” would 
swallow the MGM rule whole. 
Incitement, however, does not present this disclaimer problem, 
nor does it cause confusion on the part of the speaker as to whether 
the disclaimer will save them or damn them in the end.  In several of 
the “violent media” incitement cases,72 disclaimers have been taken 
into the analysis as a significant factor weighing against incitement li-
ability on the part of a media speaker.73  In other cases, the absence 
of a disclaimer has been deemed inconsequential, as the expression 
still failed the incitement standard, and such a warning was not even 
required.74
In Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,75 for example, Hustler Maga-
zine placed an explicit and noticeable disclaimer before its article on 
dangerous sexual practices that stated that the magazine “emphasizes 
the often-fatal dangers of the practice of ‘auto-erotic asphyxia,’ and 
recommends that readers seeking unique forms of sexual release DO 
NOT ATTEMPT this method.  The facts are presented here solely for 
an educational purpose.”76  The article also graphically depicted the 
deadly outcomes of some unfortunate experiments in the sexual 
practice detailed therein.77  The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit found that Hustler magazine’s article had not in-
cited a young man’s accidental suicide after reading the article, and 
gave significant weight to the disclaimer and the graphic warnings of 
possible accidents.78
The plaintiff in Yakubowicz v. Paramount Pictures Corp.79 was the 
father of a murder victim who was killed by members of a gang after a 
showing of the movie The Warriors, a fictional portrayal of gang vio-
lence in New York City.80  The plaintiff alleged that the defendant 
movie theater and production companies failed to “warn the exhibi-
tors of the film and those responsible for the safety of the public” and 
 72 See infra Part II.B. 
 73 See infra notes 75–78. 
 74 See infra notes 79–88. 
 75 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987). 
 76 Id. at 1018. 
 77 Id. at 1018–19. 
 78 Id. at 1023. 
 79 536 N.E.2d 1067 (Mass. 1989). 
 80 Id. at 1068. 
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“to take reasonable steps to protect [people] at or near the theater” 
showing the movie.81  Essentially, the plaintiff complained that Para-
mount and the theater should be liable for the movie’s supposed in-
citement to violence because they failed to place a disclaimer before 
the movie or to warn those responsible for exhibiting the movie and 
keeping the peace.82  This count was dismissed on summary judg-
ment.83  The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts noted that a 
“fatal assault occurring miles from the theater as a matter of law 
could not be attributed to a failure to” protect those near the theater 
or a failure on the part of Paramount or the theater owners to warn 
anyone.84   
Similarly, in Olivia N. v. National Broadcasting Co.,85 a failure to 
warn claim did not hold water with a California appellate court when 
the parents of a young rape victim alleged that a television movie de-
picting a violent rape scene incited a group of youths to attack their 
daughter.86  The parents claimed the film was “particularly likely to 
cause imitation and that NBC televised the film without proper warn-
ing in an effort to obtain the largest possible viewing audience.”87  
The movie ultimately failed the incitement test despite the absence of 
a disclaimer before the movie.88  
Were future courts to interpret the inducement test for con-
tributory copyright infringement in light of incitement, they would 
be able to avoid the messy issue of disclaimers altogether, and possi-
bly avoid future circuit splits.  Inducement leaves the door wide open 
for a flood of litigation solely on the issue of the inducing (or non-
inducing) nature of disclaimers.  By utilizing a stricter interpretation 
of the rule and reflecting on and citing to the “violent media” cases, 
future courts can avoid this potential disclaimer disarray.  Disclaimers 
are practically a non-issue in the “violent media” cases, as they are ei-
ther helpful to the speaker or are unnecessary.  This simplification 
will make MGM-type jurisprudence much tidier.  If the inducement 
standard is perpetuated as it stands, litigation would increase, and 
cases would become very convoluted. 
 81 Id. at 1072 (alteration in original). 
 82 Id. at 1068. 
 83 Id. at 1072. 
 84 Id. 
 85 178 Cal. Rptr. 888 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981). 
 86 Id. at 890–91. 
 87 Id. at 891. 
 88 Id. at 892. 
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Furthermore, either outcome of the continued use of the pre-
sent inducement rule mentioned in the context of the two situations 
at the beginning of this section would constitute a legal mockery 
when it comes to disclaimers.  If inducement could be circumvented 
simply by using a disclaimer, MGM would be rendered meaningless.  
Still, if disclaimers themselves were found to be inducing, speakers 
would be at a loss for simple methods of self-preservation.  Innova-
tion, as well as speech, would most certainly be chilled to the bone.  
Because the present interpretation of the inducement standard poses 
a lose-lose situation in the MGM context, courts should adopt a test 
that hearkens to incitement for guidance. 
2. Diversity of Concurrences in MGM: Leaning Toward 
Justice Breyer’s Opinion 
Justice Breyer and Justice Ginsburg wrote the concurring opin-
ions in MGM.  Each justice took a different view on the case, and 
their disagreement is yet another indication that the inducement 
standard is blurry to the point of uselessness.  Despite MGM being a 
unanimous decision, a diversity of concurrences is suggestive of an 
unclear rule. 
Justice Breyer’s89 concurring opinion in MGM calls for an un-
changed view of the Sony rule, which would better protect technology 
and, in turn, would better protect the speakers behind the technol-
ogy.90  Although Justice Breyer agreed with the Court’s conclusion 
and adoption of the inducement standard, he believed that Grokster 
and Streamcast had proved to the Ninth Circuit that their software 
was “capable of substantial noninfringing uses.”91  Therefore, Justice 
Breyer concluded that the stricter version of the Sony test suggested 
by Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence92 was unnecessary.93  Justice Gins-
burg urged that the evidence proffered by Grokster and Streamcast 
was insufficient to satisfy the Sony rule regarding substantial nonin-
 89 Justice Breyer has significant experience in copyright and is presumably the 
resident expert on the Supreme Court in these matters.  See Frank Pasquale, Breaking 
the Vicious Circularity: Sony’s Contribution to the Fair Use Doctrine, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
777, 810 (2005) (“Although Justice Breyer has done much to try to rationalize copy-
right law in his scholarship and opinions in copyright disputes, his work in adminis-
trative law most directly inspires my work on the topic.”). 
 90 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2796 
(2005) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 91 Id. at 2787–88 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 92 Id. at 2783–86 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 93 Id. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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fringing uses.94  She would require a stricter reading of the Sony 
rule—one that requires more evidence and more concrete examples 
of noninfringing uses before deciding whether a product is capable 
of substantial noninfringing uses.95
Justice Breyer noted, however, that in Sony, nine percent of uses 
of the VCR were found to be noninfringing and therefore substantial; 
the manufacturers in MGM had shown that approximately ten per-
cent of the uses of their software were noninfringing.96  Justice Breyer 
concluded that manufacturers’ evidence of consenting artists, free 
electronic books, public domain material, and “licensed music videos 
and movie segments” provided sufficient proof of substantial nonin-
fringing use in light of the Sony holding.97  He also emphasized that 
the Sony Court’s use of the word “capable” in its rule on noninfring-
ing uses inferred a forward-looking perspective; thus it would be pos-
sible to foresee many future noninfringing uses that either were up-
and-coming or had not even come to life yet.98
For three reasons, Justice Breyer ultimately concluded that a 
stricter reading of Sony was unnecessary.99  First, he noted that the 
Sony rule is technology-protecting in that it is clear as to what manu-
facturers can and cannot do; it is a deliberately difficult standard and 
is “forward looking” because it anticipates technological evolution 
and allows leeway for such innovation.100
Second, the Justice noted that a stricter interpretation, asking 
for a heavier evidentiary burden on the part of a defendant, would 
“undercut the protection that Sony now offers” by forcing innovators 
to provide extensive information on noninfringing uses—yet innova-
tors would still face “legal uncertainty” as to whether their new tech-
nology would be protected.101  The uncertainty would cause unpre-
dictable results in courts employing this extremely fact-sensitive 
analysis, and could result in less ambition to create, thus chilling in-
novation in general.102
 
 94 Id. at 2785–86 (Ginsburg, J. concurring). 
 95 Id. at 2786 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 96 MGM, 125 S. Ct. at 2788–89 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 97 Id. at 2789 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 98 Id. at 2789–91 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that up-and-coming uses in-
clude research, historical recordings, digital photo swapping, shareware swapping, 
licensed media file sharing, news broadcasts, and independently-created media file 
sharing); see supra note 25 for an explanation of the Sony rule. 
 99 MGM, 125 S. Ct. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 100 Id. at 2791–92 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 101 Id. at 2792–93 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 102 Id. (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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Third, Justice Breyer noted that although a stricter Sony rule 
would benefit copyright owners, it was not clear that this benefit 
would outweigh possible chills on technology.103  The Justice con-
cluded that a stricter rule may be unnecessary and dangerous be-
cause, presently, any evidence of extreme harm to copyright owners is 
uncertain.104  Justice Breyer pointed out that the statistics regarding 
P2P software’s diminuation of creative works were sparse, and proof 
of loss of entertainment industry revenue was unclear.105  Further-
more, owners of copyrights have viable alternatives: they can sue for 
direct infringement, institute new technological innovations to fur-
ther protect their works, turn a profit via legal downloading services, 
or turn to the legislature for a change in the law.106
Justice Breyer’s concurrence is the most reasonable interpreta-
tion of both Sony and MGM in light of the free speech issues men-
tioned in this Comment.  His position is technology-friendly and in-
novation-protective and calls for no change in the Sony rule, while still 
allowing for liability via inducement.107  Justice Breyer’s technology-
protective view analogizes perfectly to speech in the context of this 
Comment.  Were future courts to adopt Justice Ginsburg’s stricter 
application of the Sony rule, not only would P2P software be inhib-
 103 Id. at 2793 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 104 Id. (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 105 MGM, 125 S. Ct. at 2793–94 (Breyer, J., concurring).  “Unauthorized copying 
likely diminishes industry revenue, though it is not clear by how much.”  Id. at 2794 
(Breyer, J., concurring).  Justice Breyer compares the results of studies on industry 
revenue.  Compare Stan Liebowitz, Will MP3 Downloads Annihilate the Recording Indus-
try?  The Evidence So Far, June 2003, at 2, http://www.utdallas.edu/~liebowit/ 
intprop/records.pdf (“My conclusions, in a nutshell, are that MP3 downloading does 
appear to be causing harm.  No other explanations that have been put forward seem 
to be able to explain the decline in sales that have occurred since 1999.”), with Felix 
Oberholzer & Koleman Strumpf, The Effect of File Sharing on Record Sales: An Empirical 
Analysis, Mar. 2004, at 24, http://www.unc.edu/~cigar/papers/FileSharing_ 
March2004.pdf (“We find that file sharing has no statistically significant effect on 
purchases of the average album in our sample.”).  Justice Breyer also notes that the 
“extent to which related production has actually and resultingly declined remains 
uncertain, though there is good reason to believe that the decline, if any, is not sub-
stantial.”  MGM, 125 S. Ct. at 2794 (Breyer, J., concurring).  To support this proposi-
tion he cites Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Goods and the Emergence of 
Sharing as a Modality of Economic Production, 114 YALE L.J. 273, 351–52 (2004), which 
explains that “[m]uch of the actual flow of revenue to artists—from performances 
and other sources—is stable even assuming a complete displacement of the CD mar-
ket by [P2P] distribution . . . it would be silly to think that music . . . will cease to be 
in our world [because of illegal file swapping].”  MGM, 125 S. Ct. at 2794 (Breyer, J., 
concurring). 
 106 Id.  at 2794–96 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 107 Id. at 2794 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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ited, but the accompanying speech in advertisements and marketing 
schemes would be similarly stymied. 
If courts were to interpret Sony more strictly, they would inher-
ently have to view inducement more broadly.  Logically, if a court is 
going to require more proof to show that a product is capable of sub-
stantial noninfringing uses, it will likely require less proof to show that 
the speech advocating those uses was unprotected under the First 
Amendment.  Under Justice Breyer’s approach, however, the Sony 
rule would remain the same—difficult to satisfy yet broad and protec-
tive of innovation.  Courts could accordingly tighten inducement in 
light of the incitement cases mentioned below108 in order to grant the 
speech accompanying the technology as much deference and protec-
tion as Sony grants to the innovation itself. 
II. HOW DO WE CLARIFY THE INDUCEMENT STANDARD? 
A. The Patent Cases: No Help Here 
The MGM Court’s imported inducement rule was taken from 
many cases involving secondary infringement of patents, each of 
which placed its own spin on the rule.109  However, an analysis of the 
rule in the patent law context does nothing to clarify the standard for 
purposes of applying it in cases involving secondary liability for ex-
pression. 
Chisum explains that “a person infringes by actively and know-
ingly aiding and abetting another’s direct infringement of the pat-
ent.”110  Chisum notes that in Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, 
Inc.,111 the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held 
 108 See infra Part II.B. 
 109 See generally MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon Corp., 
No. 04-1396, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 17956, at *21, *25–*27 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 22, 2005) 
(technical support presentations and technical support through e-mail about pat-
ented material could be inducement); Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. 
Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (published articles about patented 
material could be inducing); Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Chemque, Inc., 303 F.3d 
1294, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (possible inducement by supplying customers with the 
patented product and instructions on how to use it); Water Tech. Corp. v. Calco, 
Ltd., 850 F.2d 660, 668 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (inducement liability where one “actively 
and knowingly aid[s] and abet[s] another’s direct infringement”); Fromberg, Inc. v. 
Thornhill, 315 F.2d 407, 412–13 (5th Cir. 1963) (inducement when sales staff dem-
onstrated infringing uses); R.W. Sims v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 459 F. Supp. 1198, 1217 
(E.D. Pa. 1978), rev’d and vacated, 608 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1979) (inducement in promo-
tional films and brochures depicting use of patented device). 
 110 CHISUM, supra note 62, § 17.04. 
 111 909 F.2d 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
SHOLDERFINAL 4/12/2007  12:01:04 PM 
2007] COMMENT 819 
 
that “proof of actual intent to cause the acts which constitute the in-
fringement is a necessary prerequisite to finding active induce-
ment.”112  Chisum, however, observes that a Virginia district court in 
Hauni Werke Koerber & Co. v. Molins, Ltd.,113 held just the opposite, 
finding that specific intent was unnecessary to find active induce-
ment.114  Chisum concludes that commentators have generally agreed 
that the mens rea requirement for inducement is unclear, at best, 
and that case law varies to a great degree.115  Based on its “affirmative 
intent that the product be used to infringe” language, the MGM 
Court’s take on mens rea seems to be one of an intent require-
ment.116  This language should not be taken as gospel, however, con-
sidering the MGM Court adopted the inducement rule in the wake of 
the diversity of mens rea requirements noted in the previous patent 
cases mentioned above. 
According to Chisum, actions that can constitute inducement in 
a patent context include licensing, indemnification, repair and main-
tenance, design, purchase of product, instruction, and advertising, 
and publication.117  Of most concern here, of course, is “instruction 
and advertising,” which has the most obvious First Amendment con-
notations, especially in the MGM context.118  Chisum explains that 
“instruction and advertising” can induce infringement “where a de-
fendant selling products capable of either innocent or infringing use 
provides through labels, advertising or other sales methods instruc-
tions and directions as to the infringing use.”119  The treatise explains 
this phenomenon primarily in the context of complex medical tech-
nology cases that are beyond the scope of this Comment.120
This broad articulation of the inducement standard, combined 
with the MGM Court’s statement of the rule, and the diverse patent 
inducement cases, show how heterogeneous and unclear the in-
ducement rule is.  As an overall proposition, the broad “active steps” 
to “encourage direct infringement” language used by the MGM Court 
regarding advertising and instructions, Chisum’s observation that the 
mens rea of inducement is unclear, and the wide variety of rules pro-
 112 CHISUM, supra note 62, § 17.04(2). 
 113 No. 73-404-R, 1974 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8152 (E.D. Va. June 11, 1974). 
 114 CHISUM, supra note 62, § 17.04(2). 
 115 Id. 
 116 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2779 
(2005). 
 117 CHISUM, supra note 62, §§ 17.04(4)(a)–(g). 
 118 See supra note 20; see infra Part III. 
 119 CHISUM, supra note 62, §17.04(4)(f). 
 120 Id. 
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posed by the patent law inducement cases, together suggest that in-
ducement is a broad, easy-to-apply, yet extremely unclear rule.121  
Analysis of patent doctrine does nothing to clarify it. 
B. The Incitement Standard and the “Violent Media” Cases: Likely 
Heroes 
Falling closer to the entertainment industry that spawned MGM, 
the incitement rule is overwhelmingly the standard used in what may 
be referred to broadly as the “violent media” line of cases.122  The in-
citement standard is the best tool with which to clarify the induce-
ment rule because the “violent media” incitement cases, like MGM, 
involve secondary liability related to expression.  In these cases, a 
media entity (such as a musician or a movie producer) disseminates 
his or her entertainment product, a consumer of that product (a lis-
tener of the music or a viewer of the movie) subsequently inflicts 
harm upon herself or harms a third party, and the media entity is 
blamed for such conduct.123  These cases provide an intriguing over-
view of the application of the incitement test to speakers whose pri-
mary purpose in speech is creative, often copyrightable, expression.124  
Despite divergences in jurisdictions, these cases overwhelmingly con-
clude in the protection of the arts and the speakers who disseminate 
these expressive products.125 
The incitement test, itself, stands in stark contrast to the loose 
requirements of the inducement rule.  As set forth in Brandenburg v. 
Ohio,126 the incitement standard says that 
the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not 
permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force 
or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or 
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such 
action.127
The Supreme Court of the United States, in Brandenburg, em-
phasized that statutes violate First Amendment rights by proscribing 
“the mere abstract teaching . . . of the moral propriety or even moral 
 121 MGM, 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2779–80.  For an overview of the nuances of the patent 
inducement rule, see supra note 109. 
 122 As discussed below, the label “violent media cases” comes from the common 
presence in these cases of a media consumer committing a violent act upon himself 
or others allegedly at the behest of the media speaker. 
 123 See generally infra note 188. 
 124 See generally infra note 188. 
 125 But see infra note 185. 
 126 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
 127 Id. at 447 (emphasis added). 
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necessity for a resort to force and violence.”128  The incitement stan-
dard is a test that requires a higher level of scrutiny and arguably pro-
vides a greater level of protection to speakers, as it requires both im-
minence of lawless action and likelihood that the speech will cause 
such action.129
In Brandenburg, a Ku Klux Klan leader held a rally on his farm 
and invited a television reporter to tape the action.130  He was conse-
quently convicted under the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism statute for 
his advocacy of “the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, 
violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplish-
ing industrial or political reform” and for assembling “with any soci-
ety, group, or assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the 
doctrines of criminal syndicalism.”131  The cameras caught images of 
hooded figures carrying firearms gathered around a burning cross, 
spouting racial epithets, and giving inflammatory speeches about 
their hatred of minorities and taking “revengeance” on the govern-
ment for oppressing whites.132  The Brandenburg Court adopted and 
applied the above test and held that the Ohio statute was invalid, as it 
proscribed mere advocacy of violence and not “incitement to immi-
nent lawless action.”133  As stated above, this is the bedrock test ap-
plied in the following media/expression-related cases. 
In Byers v. Edmonson134 the plaintiff, Byers, was shot and rendered 
paralyzed during a convenience store robbery.135  The shooter, Sarah 
Edmondson, and her boyfriend Benjamin Darrus, had left their 
home in Oklahoma to go to a concert, but instead engaged in a 
multi-state shooting spree ending in one murder and Byers’s paraly-
sis.136  Upon their apprehension, Edmonson explained that the cou-
ple had watched the movie Natural Born Killers the night before their 
trip.137  She noted that they had watched the movie several times re-
cently and that they had taken LSD.138  Edmonson claimed they 
would not have taken a gun on their trip but for watching the movie, 
and that the movie had a “numbing influence” on them which 
 128 Id. at 448 (quoting Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297–98 (1961)). 
 129 Id. at 447. 
 130 Id. at 445–47. 
 131 Id. at 444–45. 
 132 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 445–47. 
 133 Id. at 448–49. 
 134 826 So. 2d 551 (La. Ct. App. 2002). 
 135 Id. at 553. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. at 553 n.2. 
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sparked a desire to feel “the power of violence.”139  Byers conse-
quently filed a lawsuit against the couple, as well as Time Warner, the 
production company behind Natural Born Killers, and Oliver Stone, 
the film’s director.140  Byers’s theory was that the murderous couple 
was inspired and incited by the movie, and that the movie’s content 
had caused their violent behavior.141
The Louisiana appellate court held that, despite the abundance 
of violent imagery in the movie, it did not constitute incitement be-
cause nothing in the movie necessarily “exhorts, urges, entreats, solic-
its, or overtly advocates or encourages unlawful or violent activity on 
the part of viewers.”142  The movie did not “purport to order or com-
mand anyone to perform any concrete action immediately or at any 
specific time,” nor did it ever direct nor urge viewers “to commit any 
type of imminent lawless activity.”143
The Byers court viewed the film and decided that this was a 
“copycat scenario” that did not remove the film from First Amend-
ment protection simply because it had “a tendency to lead to vio-
lence.”144  Although the shooters may have imitated the characters in 
the movie out of inspiration to feel the power they felt while watching 
the characters’ violent crime spree, the court decided, as a matter of 
law, that Natural Born Killers was not inciteful because it did not “di-
rect or encourage them to take such actions.”145
The Byers court focused much of its analysis on the artistic ele-
ments of the movie.146  The movie was not inciteful because it was not 
mainly about violence or murder, but portrayed the life and lifestyle 
of the main characters, their relationship, their incidental killing 
sprees, and “how their exploits are glorified by the media to the point 
where they become cultural icons.”147  A main point of analysis was 
the film’s imagery, such as its frequent colorization changes, cartoon 
clips, “facial distortions,” “sitcom laugh tracks,” and use of slow mo-
tion and bizarre camera angles, all of which “place[d] [the] film in 
the realm of fantasy.”148  This analysis, like in the other cases to follow, 
seemed to focus on the expressive elements of the film protected by 
 139 Id. 
 140 Byers, 826 So. 2d at 554. 
 141 Id. at 553–54. 
 142 Id. at 556. 
 143 Id. 
 144 Id. at 557 (quoting Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 109 (1973)). 
 145 Id. 
 146 Byers, 862 So. 2d at 556. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. 
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the First Amendment, coupled with its failure of the Brandenburg 
test.149
A similar case, Yakubowicz v. Paramount Pictures Corp.,150 involved 
the murder of a young man during a remote incident of gang vio-
lence shortly after a public theater showed the movie The Warriors.151  
The decedent’s father sued Paramount (the producer and distributor 
of the movie), alleging that the movie, a fictional story about gang 
violence in New York City, incited his son’s killer to stab him to 
death.152
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts viewed the film 
and decided that nothing in it constituted incitement despite its 
many violent scenes, because at no time did the film “exhort, urge, 
entreat, solicit, or overtly advocate or encourage unlawful or violent 
activity on the part of viewers.”153  The film did not create a likelihood 
of imminent lawless action and it did not command viewers to imme-
diately commit violent acts.154  The court held that this work of fic-
tion, this creative story, did not constitute unprotected incitement, 
and the defendant movie companies were not unreasonable in creat-
ing the work and disseminating it to the public.155
Cases involving music follow essentially the same trend and 
analysis, yet focus more on lyrics as poetic device and metaphor 
which lack a direct command to action.156  In Davidson v. Time Warner, 
Inc.,157 gang member Ronald Howard shot and killed Texas State 
Trooper Bill Davidson after the officer stopped Howard (who was 
driving a stolen car) for a routine traffic violation.158  At the time he 
shot Officer Davidson, Howard was listening to 2Pacaplyse Now, a Tu-
pac Shakur rap record.159  The murdered officer’s family sued Shakur 
and the defendant record labels, claiming, inter alia, that the record 
incited the killing.160
A Texas district court held that the plaintiffs could not prove 
Howard’s violent action was a likely, imminent result of listening to 
 149 Id. at 556–57. 
 150 536 N.E.2d 1067 (Mass. 1989). 
 151 Id. at 1068. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. at 1071. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. at 1072. 
 156 See infra notes 157–84 and accompanying text. 
 157 No. V-94-006, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21559 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 1997). 
 158 Id. at *4. 
 159 Id. 
 160 Id. at *6. 
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2Pacalypse Now even though Shakur’s intent may have been to pro-
duce such action.161  “At worst,” the court noted, “Shakur’s intent was 
to cause violence some time after the listener considered Shakur’s 
message.  The First Amendment protects such advocacy.”162  Although 
the music and lyrics were insulting and derogatory (or, as Shakur 
called them, “revolutionary”), the plaintiffs failed to show that Shakur 
intended to incite imminent violence, and even if he did, such vio-
lence was not a likely result of listening to the record.163
The court also explained that rational listeners could not possi-
bly believe that “musical lyrics and poetry” were the equivalent of “lit-
eral commands or directives to immediate action” aimed specifically 
at the individual listener.164  Such a belief would not be in accordance 
with First Amendment protection of expressive speech, such as song 
lyrics.165  Simply because “weak-willed individuals may be influenced 
by Shakur’s work” does not mean that the courts will remove the 
work’s First Amendment protection.166
The Davidson court cites to McCollum v. CBS, Inc.,167 another 
landmark music case from several years earlier, involving heavy metal 
icon Ozzy Osbourne.168  In McCollum, a teenager shot himself while 
listening to Osbourne’s record.169  Despite the teenager’s substance 
abuse problems and emotional turmoil, his parents sued Osbourne 
and the accompanying record labels for proximately causing their 
son’s suicide.170  One of their theories was incitement to imminent 
lawless action via a song called Suicide Solution.171
As in the previous cases, a California appellate court in McCollum 
could find no incitement.172  Intent and likelihood of violence were 
 161 Id. at *63. 
 162 Id. 
 163 Davidson, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21559, at *66.  The court noted that the re-
cord had been released three years prior and had sold over 400,000 copies; that be-
ing said, the Davidsons were the first parties to bring an incitement suit against Sha-
kur and the record labels, making it unlikely that the album caused Howard’s violent 
behavior.  Id.  Howard was also a gang member driving a stolen car, most likely fear-
ing arrest, which suggests even a lesser likelihood that the murder was triggered by 
the music.  Id. 
 164 Id. at *67–*68 (citing McCollum v. CBS, 249 Cal. Rptr. 187, 194 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1988)). 
 165 Id. at *68. 
 166 Id. at *70. 
 167 249 Cal. Rptr. 187 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988). 
 168 Id. at 188. 
 169 Id. at 189. 
 170 Id. 
 171 Id. at 190–91. 
 172 Id. at 194–95. 
SHOLDERFINAL 4/12/2007  12:01:04 PM 
2007] COMMENT 825 
 
absent, as the decedent was not even listening to Suicide Solution at 
the time of his death; imminency was lacking because nothing in Os-
bourne’s songs “could be characterized as a command to an immedi-
ate suicidal act.”173  Taking the lyrics literally, the court still could not 
find that they constituted a command to commit suicide, and if they 
had, such action was not demanded at a specific, immediate time.174  
The McCollum court noted that when judges act as censors, the lyrics 
of a song can be seriously misconstrued, especially when they were 
meant to be “a play on words, to convey meanings entirely contrary to 
those asserted by plaintiff.”175
Ultimately, the court held that creative expression such as song 
lyrics and poetry could not be “construed to contain the requisite 
‘call to action’” and that a reasonable listener would interpret the lyr-
ics as poetic device, symbolism, or metaphor.176  Rational persons 
could not mistake lyrical expression for specific, personal, immediate 
commands to take imminent violent action, and the First Amend-
ment does not permit any contrary assumption.177  The court noted 
that art which causes a depressive mood does not automatically con-
stitute incitement, and the philosophical ideas regarding suicide as a 
plausible alternative to life can be freely advocated and constitute 
protected expression no matter how bizarre or controversial they may 
be.178
A few years after McCollum, Osbourne ran into the same problem 
regarding his music in a case called Waller v. Osbourne.179  Another 
young man took his own life supposedly while listening to an Os-
bourne record, and his parents sued the artist for disseminating mu-
sic that purportedly incited their son to kill himself.180  A Georgia dis-
trict court found a lack of incitement because Osbourne’s music was 
not “directed toward any particular person or group of persons” and 
there was no evidence that the music “was intended to produce acts 
of suicide and likely to cause imminent acts of suicide; nor could one 
rationally infer such a meaning from the lyrics.”181  The plaintiffs had 
 173 McCollum, 249 Cal. Rptr. at 193. 
 174 Id. 
 175 Id. 
 176 Id. at 194. 
 177 Id. 
 178 Id. 
 179 763 F. Supp. 1144 (M.D. Ga. 1991). 
 180 Id. at 1145. 
 181 Id. at 1151. 
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not even proved that the decedent had listened to the song right be-
fore he shot himself.182
The court’s analysis of Suicide Solution mirrored the McCollum 
court’s analysis by emphasizing that philosophical assertions about 
suicide constituting “abstract discussion” are not equivalent to an 
imminent urge or encouragement that someone should take such ac-
tion.183  This artistic expression did not rise to the level of incitement 
to imminent lawless action and was therefore shielded by First 
Amendment protections.184
At this point in the analysis it is important to note that incite-
ment is a valid test—not a neutered one—despite the vast majority of 
media incitement cases concluding in the same manner.  The test is 
not merely mechanically applied with the blind expectation that 
every case will turn out the same; incitement is valid because there 
are exceptions to the general rule—where the media have been 
found liable for incitement—as seen in Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, 
Inc.185  In this case, the publishers of a book called Hit Man: A Techni-
cal Manual for Independent Contractors were found liable when a hired 
contract killer precisely followed the detailed instructions in the 
guidebook for murder to aid him in committing a triple homicide.186  
The book and its publisher lost their First Amendment protection 
because the book went beyond mere advocacy and constituted in-
citement, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit found that the publisher had aided and abetted the murders via 
the guidebook.187
 182 Id. at 1151 n.15. 
 183 Id. 
 184 The Waller court also engaged in a lengthy discussion about the plaintiff’s alle-
gations that Osbourne’s songs contained subliminal messages.  Id. at 1146–48.  The 
court ultimately decided that such messages did not exist; however, this is not deter-
minative for incitement purposes.  Waller, 763 F. Supp. at 1148–50. 
 185 128 F.3d 233, 250 (4th Cir. 1997) (noting that the district court had “erred . . . 
[when it misunderstood] . . . Brandenburg to protect not just abstract advocacy of law-
lessness and the open criticism of government and its institutions, but also the teach-
ing of the technical methods of criminal activity—in this case, the technical methods 
of murder”). 
 186 Id. at 239. 
 187 Id. at 250, 255. 
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The violent media cases do follow a clear trend, however.188  Ex-
pressive, often copyrightable, creations such as movies, music, and 
song lyrics have almost never been found to have incited imminent 
lawless action.  Such expression generally finds solid protection un-
der the First Amendment behind the shield of the Brandenburg in-
citement test.  The speech at issue in MGM would likely fall in step 
with the majority of these incitement cases, as opposed to the excep-
tion, Rice; this issue is addressed in more detail in the following sec-
tion.  The speech at issue in MGM—advertisements, marketing 
schemes, and internal communications—do not come anywhere 
close to a detailed hitman manual, and as copyrightable commercial 
material, would fall much closer to the side of the fence where the 
creative expression seen in the violent media cases fell.  The only ex-
ception may be Grokster’s newsletter to users,189 mentioned above, 
which may or may not find solace under even a stricter inducement 
test.  Therefore, were inducement interpreted in a stricter, more pro-
speech, incitement-esque light, the majority of the commercial 
speech at issue in MGM would be shielded by the First Amendment, 
and the speakers would be immune from secondary liability.190
III.     INDUCEMENT AND INCITEMENT AS DISTINCT: SECONDARY 
LIABILITY FOR EXPRESSION AND THE NECESSITY FOR COPYRIGHT TO 
ACKNOWLEDGE THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
By placing inducement and incitement side by side, the reader 
can see that the two standards are very different.  Incitement, gener-
ally, is an extremely difficult standard to meet—especially in the con-
text of creative, often copyrightable, expression such as music, mov-
ies, and song lyrics—as it requires both imminent illegal action and a 
likelihood that the illegal action will occur.191  Inducement, on the 
other hand, is a more expansive and ambiguous test that is not alto-
gether clear, and is easily satisfied in the patent infringement cases 
 188 See also James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683, 697–99 (6th Cir. 2002) (video 
games, movies, and internet pornography did not incite school shooter’s killing 
spree); Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1022–23 (5th Cir. 1987) 
(Hustler magazine did not incite boy’s accidental suicide by hanging after he read an 
article about autoerotic asphyxia, a dangerous sexual practice); Olivia N. v. Nat’l 
Broad. Co., 178 Cal. Rptr. 888, 892 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (rape scene in a television 
movie did not incite copycat rape of a young girl); Pahler v. Slayer, No. CV 79356, 
2001 WL 1736476, at *4 (Cal. Super. Oct. 29, 2001) (death metal band, Slayer, did 
not incite rape and murder of a young girl through song lyrics). 
 189 See supra notes 20 and 21 and accompanying text. 
 190 See infra Part III. 
 191 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); see supra Part II.B. 
SHOLDERFINAL 4/12/2007  12:01:04 PM 
828 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:799 
 
mentioned above.192  As a general proposition, incitement is a more 
speech-protective doctrine because it is harder to satisfy the test.  
Logically, the harder the test is to satisfy, the more speech will retain 
its First Amendment protection.  More often than not, political193 and 
creative speech194 will escape incitement liability.  Inducement, how-
ever, has historically been used in a strictly patent context and its ap-
plication has often been successful.195
The speech at issue in MGM—advertisements, marketing plans, 
press releases, and internal communications regarding such plans—
are granted First Amendment protection as commercial speech.196  
The commercial speech in MGM is more akin to the copyrightable 
creative and expressive speech protected by the incitement standard 
in the violent media cases,197 as opposed to the inventions and proc-
esses which are afforded strict patent protection to which the in-
ducement standard applies.198  Courts should interpret the MGM in-
ducement rule in light of the incitement standard and thus make 
inducement a more speech-protective test that preserves First 
Amendment rights of software designers and advertisers.199  As noted 
 192 For an overview of the nuances of the patent inducement rule, see supra note 
109. 
 193 See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 448–49. 
 194 See supra Part II.B. 
 195 For an overview of the nuances of the patent inducement rule, see supra note 
109. 
 196 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 
557, 564 (1980) (Commercial speech is protected, generally, if it constitutes speech, 
it is lawful, and it is not misleading.).  Although it could be argued that the speech at 
issue here is not legal (and therefore not protected commercial speech) because it 
“induces” copyright infringement, this circular assertion simply begs the issue.  If the 
test to be used were stricter, like incitement, the speech would not be found illegal 
because it would lack immanency.  See supra Part II.B.  To argue that the speech at 
issue in MGM falls outside commercial speech protection goes beyond the scope of 
this Comment and creates a circular argument that defeats the purpose of determin-
ing the proper test to use in circumstances similar to MGM. 
 197 Joel Timmer, When a Commercial is Not a Commercial: Advertising of Violent Enter-
tainment and the First Amendment, 7 COMM. L. & POL’Y 157, 186 (2002) (“Because ad-
vertising of media products often embodies ideas or opinions in the underlying 
works, courts will likely accord such advertising the same level of First Amendment 
protection given the artistic expression in the works themselves.”). 
 198 For an overview of the nuances of the patent inducement rule, see supra note 
109. 
 199 It is inconsequential that the violent media cases do not touch on the issue of 
copyrightability.  The analogy here is that the expression in the violent media cases 
fell under one test (incitement), and would be the subject of copyright protection, 
whereas the intellectual property in the inducement cases fell under another test 
(inducement), and would be the subject of patent protection.  The key is that the 
speech in MGM falls more on the side of the violent media cases than the patent in-
ducement cases.  Therefore, it should fall under an interpretation of inducement 
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above, incitement is the best way to clarify the already-hazy induce-
ment standard,200 and by interpreting inducement in this way, the 
speech at issue in MGM would not pass muster based on the analysis 
of the violent media cases, and would therefore be protected under 
the First Amendment.201
This proposition of a paradigmatic shift in the interpretation of 
the inducement standard is born out of the notion that copyright and 
patent protect very different types of intellectual property.  The copy-
right statute states that copyright protection applies to “original works 
of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . . from 
which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communi-
cated.”202  Copyright protection specifically does not apply to “any 
idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, 
principle, or discovery” despite the form in which it appears.203  Pat-
ent protection, however, extends to inventions or discoveries of “any 
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of 
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.”204  Patent pro-
tection will imbue if a product or process is useful, novel, and non-
obvious.205  Patent protection is more a form of idea protection than 
copyright even though the inventor must have documentation of his 
invention in the form of a patent application (including an oath, 
drawings, models or specimens, and specific claims of protection) to 
get protection.206  The inventor generally need not even work the in-
vention to maintain this security because the inventor has protected 
the idea by reduction to practice or constructive reduction to prac-
tice.207
more akin to the incitement test instead of the more generous patent inducement 
test, because the speech in MGM is a closer analogue to copyrightable speech than to 
patentable inventions. 
 200 See supra Part II.B. 
 201 See supra Part II.B.  The advertisements to former users, offerings of software, 
diversion of search queries, technical assistance, and refusal to filter content would 
likely fail a stricter interpretation of the inducement rule, and therefore be protected 
under the First Amendment.  Grokster’s newsletter promoting its ability to find copy-
righted material may be the only questionable element in light of Rice v. Paladin En-
ters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 202 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000). 
 203 Id. § 102(b). 
 204 35 U.S.C. § 100 (2000). 
 205 Id. §§ 101–03. 
 206 Id. §§ 111–15. 
 207 See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE 
DOCTRINES 439–40 (rev. 5th ed. 2004). 
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Copyright protection is much more narrowly drawn in protect-
ing only expression of ideas and not ideas themselves, or inventions 
embodying ideas.  Nevertheless, copyright is a more mercurial con-
cept than patent, which, although more idea-protective than copy-
right, is more tangible in its protection of concrete products and in-
ventions.  What may constitute expression of an idea is vaguer.208  
Inducement seems more appropriate for patent cases because it is a 
looser, broader standard that can apply easily in cases where a tangi-
ble, valuable product or idea is infringed, even based on advertising 
or marketing.  The stricter standard of incitement, on the other 
hand, applies more appropriately to expressive speech, which is more 
likely to be the subject of copyright, simply because of its elusive na-
ture.  Perhaps because free expression is a broad concept and a val-
ued activity, courts and legislatures have accepted a stricter test in or-
der to give more First Amendment protection to what they view as a 
valuable constitutional right.209  Because the commercial speech at is-
sue in MGM is a closer cousin to the expressive copyrightable speech 
found privileged in the “violent media” incitement cases, an incite-
ment-influenced reading of inducement should apply to the adver-
tisements and marketing plans at use in MGM, which may themselves 
be considered expressive and creative, and therefore copyrightable.210
In MGM, copyright law essentially trumps free speech in adver-
tisements and marketing schemes.  The Supreme Court of the United 
 208 See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 101–02, 107 (1879) (early Supreme Court case 
identifying the confusion inherent in the idea/expression dichotomy). 
 209 See Susan W. Brenner, Complicit Publication: When Should the Dissemination of Ideas 
and Data Be Criminalized?, 13 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 273, 302–03 (2003) (“Brandenburg 
is . . . more protective of speech than Holmes’ [clear and present danger] standard 
because it demands a closer connection between speech and unlawful action . . . .  
‘[R]are will be the speech that not only advocates lawless action, but is likely to ac-
complish that result imminently.’”) (internal citations omitted); William Li, Unbaking 
the Adolescent Cake: The Constitutional Implications of Imposing Tort Liability on Publishers 
of Violent Video Games, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 467 (2003): 
[Brandenburg] operates as a higher standard of causation[;] . . . applica-
tion of the usual standard of proximate cause has the potential to ex-
pose the media to tort liability for just about any creative work that 
somehow inspires a child or mentally ill individual to commit an act of 
violence.  Therefore, Brandenburg requires “incitement” as a higher 
standard of causation than mere “influence” or “inspiration” . . . [and] 
constitutes a viable compromise between a plaintiff’s interests in com-
pensation and a defendant’s free speech interests. 
Id. at 493–94 (internal citations omitted). 
 210 See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251–52 (1903) 
(finding that lithograph advertisements were sufficiently expressive to be considered 
copyrightable expression; advertisements were not exempt from copyright protection 
simply because they served a commercial purpose). 
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States, however, has applied a patent test in a copyright situation.  Fu-
ture courts should recognize this disparity and realize that the speech 
at issue is more akin to the copyrightable speech in the “violent me-
dia” incitement cases as opposed to the patented products protected 
in the inducement cases.  Because the Court in MGM favors copyright 
protection over free speech, it should employ a more copyright-
applicable test as opposed to a broad patent test.  In arguing this 
proposition, it is important to reiterate the conflict between free 
speech and copyright and explain the goals of each doctrine. 
Copyright protection and free speech conflict in that the First 
Amendment instructs the government “not to abridge speech on the 
one hand, and the Copyright (and Patent) Clause . . . permits Con-
gress to limit speech, on the other.”211  That being said, the long-term 
goal of copyright protection and the short-term goal of free speech 
often clash.212  Generally speaking, the long-term goal of copyright “is 
the enhancement of learning, the advancement of knowledge and 
the progress of science” through a limited monopoly on certain 
qualified forms of expression, whereas the goal of the First Amend-
ment is immediate freedom from government interference with 
speech.213  The long-term goal of copyright protection restricts free 
speech for the short-term “and has the practical effect of strengthen-
ing the property rights during that period.”214
Recent cases, such as Eldred v. Ashcroft,215 have extended this 
property right even further, resulting in even more limitation on free 
speech in the short-run in favor of copyright protection in the long-
run.216  The plaintiff in Eldred ran an online service allowing free 
downloads of public domain books; he challenged the constitutional-
ity of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 
(“CTEA”) arguing, inter alia, violation of his First Amendment rights 
to make speech accessible to those who visit his website.217  The Su-
preme Court of the United States ultimately found that the CTEA 
(which added an extra twenty years of copyright protection to new 
and existing works) was constitutional, and rejected the plaintiff’s 
claims of conflict with the First Amendment.218
 211 Birnhack, supra note 11, at 1304. 
 212 Michael Birnhack, The Copyright Law and Free Speech Affair: Making-Up and Break-
ing-Up, 43 IDEA 233, 293 (2003). 
 213 Id. 
 214 Id. 
 215 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
 216 Id. at 218–21. 
 217 Id. at 192–94. 
 218 Id. at 218–21. 
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In the MGM context, the short-term result in applying the in-
ducement test would be to restrict speech by advertisers and software 
manufacturers by favoring the long-term goal of copyright protection 
of authors whose materials may (or may not) be infringed.  Essen-
tially, the MGM Court is validating this existing “copyright exception 
to the First Amendment,” which was recently bolstered and upgraded 
by Eldred.219
Volokh suggests that Eldred created an important boundary to 
this “copyright exception”: “The copyright exception immunizes only 
laws that protect creative expression rather than facts or ideas” and 
the allowance of free communication of facts balances the free 
speech/copyright scales, thus making copyright law constitutional 
based on its built-in “idea/expression dichotomy.”220  As mentioned 
above, this protection is different from the protection afforded by 
patent law, which generally allows for the protection of ideas.221
Volokh also points out, however, that despite the 
idea/expression dichotomy and the seemingly universal protection 
on the expression of factual information, copyright law may indeed 
restrict publication of facts in some circumstances: when a newspaper 
publishes “a story about a store that sells some infringing material” 
and the story “mentions the store’s name and address” or when a 
website provides the name and URL of another web site that distrib-
utes infringing material.222  In Volokh’s hypotheticals, the speakers’ 
publication of facts could constitute contributory infringement of the 
copyrights at issue.223
In the MGM context, such publication of facts could constitute 
inducement on the part of the newspaper publisher, writer, webmas-
ter, or website designer.  Because the broad-based inducement rule 
adopted in MGM is a patent standard, it does not take into account 
the inherent effects the rule could have on otherwise freely expressi-
ble factual assertions because there simply are no free speech issues in 
the patent context.  Were future courts to interpret the inducement 
rule in light of incitement, a more copyright-friendly and speech-
friendly doctrine, the conflict seen in the MGM context would dis-
solve.  Arguably, the advertisements and marketing schemes at issue 
 219 Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Intellectual Property: Some Thoughts After El-
dred, 44 Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 697, 713 (2003). 
 220 Id. at 713–14. 
 221 See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 207, at 439–40. 
 222 Volokh, supra note 219, at 715. 
 223 Id. 
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in MGM were inherently factual,224 which would afford them protec-
tion under an altered, stricter interpretation of the inducement rule, 
despite the fact that traditional copyright law (as expressed by Vo-
lokh’s examples) may still bar the speech under a contributory in-
fringement theory.225
CONCLUSION 
Courts facing future cases analogous to MGM should utilize an 
incitement-tinged interpretation of the inducement rule as opposed 
to strictly interpreting the test in a broad patent sense.  The induce-
ment rule, as it stands, is murky and unworkable, and would lead to 
courts perpetuating secondary liability for expression on a convo-
luted path toward a state of confusion.  Clarification of inducement 
in light of incitement and the “violent media” cases, as well as differ-
entiating between the types of intellectual property protected by each 
test, will afford more First Amendment protection to advertisers and 
marketers of P2P software, and will ensure that both their advertise-
ments and disclaimers will receive the protection they constitutionally 
deserve.  The goal of affording this protection is, of course, to pre-
vent a chilling effect on speech and innovation, alike.  This proposed 
interpretation of the test, however, is not without teeth, and could 
still bar speech in some factual circumstances.226
To say that illicit downloading and the proliferation of P2P soft-
ware in the last several years is a contentious issue would be an un-
derstatement.  Amidst the melee and mudslinging, the defiance of 
downloaders and the counter-defiance of the copyright owners, as 
well as the staggering number of lawsuits, the issue of free speech 
seems to have been lost, hiding under a rock in hopes of avoiding the 
crossfire.  Nevertheless, free speech implications are unavoidable 
when dealing with the marketing and advertising of P2P software or 
any technology.  If courts are going to deal with the conflict between 
copyright and technological innovation, they will also have to deal 
with the First Amendment’s potential conflicts with inducement.  
When these issues inevitably arise, courts should employ an interpre-
tation of the MGM inducement rule in light of the “violent media” 
incitement cases to ensure as much First Amendment protection to 
advertisements and marketing schemes as courts should analogously 
 224 For a description of these materials, see supra note 20. 
 225 Volokh, supra note 219, at 715–16. 
 226 As mentioned in supra note 201, Grokster’s newsletter promoting its ability to 
find copyrighted material may be the only questionable element in light of Rice v. 
Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997). 
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afford to the technological innovations that act as the impetus for 
such commercial speech. 
 
